Large state-owned shareholders and cash holding: Evidence from family firms
Ying Wu and
Qi Chang
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2024, vol. 85, issue C
Abstract:
This paper investigates the effect of large state-owned shareholders on cash holding in family firms. Using a large sample of Chinese listed family firms for 2012–2022, we find that large state-owned shareholders positively impact cash holding in family firms. The finding remains valid to a battery of sensitivity tests and is attenuated for family firms with higher control power of the controlling shareholder, family firms originating from the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and family firms located in regions with lower levels of institutional development. Economic mechanism tests show that large state-owned shareholders increase cash holding in family firms by reducing related-party transactions and perk consumption. These findings support the view that better corporate governance may increase corporate cash holding and suggest that state-owned ownership is an essential variable in the predictors of cash holding in family firms.
Keywords: Large state-owned shareholders; Family firms; Cash holding; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X24001252
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:85:y:2024:i:c:s0927538x24001252
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2024.102374
Access Statistics for this article
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is currently edited by K. Chan and S. Ghon Rhee
More articles in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().