Influential price and wage setters, monetary policy and real effects

George Bratsiotis ()

European Journal of Political Economy, 2008, vol. 24, issue 2, 503-517

Abstract: Using a microfounded general equilibrium model, this paper shows that when large monopolistic firms or unions perceive even a small influence on aggregate nominal variables, price targeting results in a higher equilibrium output than monetary accommodation. This is because price targeting increases, whereas monetary accommodation decreases, (i) the price elasticity of demand, (ii) the labour elasticity of demand and (iii) the elasticity of the wage with respect to the household's total income. Within this framework, we also show that (a) price targeting combined with wage centralization raise welfare, (b) the standard approximation that no single price or wage setter can affect nominal aggregates is appropriate only when (a) at least a few hundreds of such large firms exist and (b) wage centralization is low.

Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Influential Price and Wage Setters, Monetary Policy and Real Effects (2005)
Working Paper: Influential Price and Wage Setters, Monetary Policy and Real Effects (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:503-517

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