Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?

Helge Berger (), Volker Nitsch and Tonny Lybek

European Journal of Political Economy, 2008, vol. 24, issue 4, 817-832

Abstract: This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Keywords: E52; E58; E61; Committee; Council; Governance; Decision; making; Monetary; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176-2680(08)00036-0
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Central Bank Boards around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (2008)
Working Paper: Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ? (2007)
Working Paper: Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:4:p:817-832

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().