Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict

Giacomo Battiston, Matteo Bizzarri and Riccardo Franceschin

European Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 86, issue C

Abstract: Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a theoretical framework involving a potential aggressor and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if the third party’s incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party’s incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, we explain how our theory relates to policy-relevant case studies involving conflict-ridden areas (including inter-state or civil conflicts) and powerful third parties.

Keywords: Conflict; Resource curse; Third party; Oil; Intervention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 P48 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Related works:
Working Paper: Third-Party Interest, Resource Value, and the Likelihood of Conflict (2022)
Working Paper: Third-Party Interest, Resource Value, and the Likelihood of Conflict (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:86:y:2025:i:c:s017626802400137x

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635

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