A dictator’s retort to economic sanctions: Evidence from North Korea

Youngseok Park

European Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 89, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines how economic sanctions affect internal resource allocation in North Korea. Drawing on insights from the political economy of authoritarian regimes, I propose that as sanctions intensify, the regime reallocates resources to maintain elite loyalty at the expense of weapons development. Using satellite-based nighttime lights data as a proxy for regional economic activity, I find that sanctions increase light intensity in elite-dominated areas like Pyongyang, while brightness declines around nuclear facilities. These findings suggest that sanctions may unintentionally reinforce regime stability by redirecting resources toward the ruling elite.

Keywords: Economic sanctions; Resource allocation; Selectorate theory; North Korea; Nighttime lights data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 P26 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:89:y:2025:i:c:s0176268025000928

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102732

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