Local government responses to procurement centralization: Evidence from Italy

Lorenzo Castellani, Francesco Decarolis and Gabriele Rovigatti

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2025, vol. 103, issue C

Abstract: This paper analyzes how local public authorities in Italy responded to recent procurement centralization reforms. Using detailed data on all Italian public contracts awarded between 2015 and 2017, we document three types of strategic behavior aimed at retaining local autonomy. First, authorities anticipating the reforms accelerated purchases to avoid central oversight. Second, they manipulated contract values to remain below monetary thresholds. Third, when required to centralize, they often chose the least centralized forms of coordination. These findings highlight how institutional design and local incentives can blunt the intended effects of centralization policies, offering broader lessons for procurement reform across the EU.

Keywords: Administrative law; Auctions; Centralization; Procurement; Public contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 K23 L22 L74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:103:y:2025:i:c:s1062976925000535

DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2025.102012

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