An empirical study of executive option grants around initial public offerings

Xudong Fu, Qin Lian, Tian Tang and Qiming Wang

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2015, vol. 57, issue C, 207-221

Abstract: From insider trading filings, we compile a comprehensive sample of executive options granted to executives and board members around initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1996 to 2008 and find a spike of option grants around IPOs. Using this sample, we investigate the determinants of IPO options and their effects on IPO pricing and long term performance. We find that granting IPO options is correlated with insiders selling secondary shares and reducing ownership stake in the offering. This evidence suggests that IPO options are likely substitutes for insiders’ diluted ownership due to IPOs. IPO options, however, are not a management self-serving mechanism as we find no significant relation between IPO options and underpricing, nor do they align executive interest with shareholders for better performance as we find that IPOs with IPO options do not have better long-run stock returns or operating performance than IPOs without IPO options.

Keywords: IPO; Executive stock options; Underpricing; Long-run performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:57:y:2015:i:c:p:207-221

DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2015.02.002

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