Do firms get what they pay for? A second thought on over-allotment option in IPOs

Emanuele Bajo, Massimiliano Barbi and Giovanni Petrella

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2017, vol. 63, issue C, 219-232

Abstract: The over-allotment option usually complements an IPO to meet any excess demand and provides underwriters with an incentive to stabilize stock prices in the aftermarket. This clause represents an additional source of compensation to the investment bank, in exchange of some uncertain positive outcomes to the issuing firm. In this paper we provide evidence of the effects of the over-allotment option on underwriting fees, IPO underpricing, and price stabilization, and we document that, contrary to our expectations, this clause does not reduce the underwriting fees and the IPO underpricing, and it does not increase the aftermarket stabilization.

Keywords: Over-allotment option; IPO; Stabilization; Underpricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976916000260
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:63:y:2017:i:c:p:219-232

DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2016.02.012

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance is currently edited by R. J. Arnould and J. E. Finnerty

More articles in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().