Does information about auditor switches affect investing decisions?

Arnold Schneider

Research in Accounting Regulation, 2015, vol. 27, issue 1, 39-44

Abstract: This study examines the impact of auditor dismissals and resignations on investing decisions. The study also aims to ascertain whether these decisions differ due to a reason given for the dismissal or resignation. Participants were given a scenario involving an investing decision and were first asked to assess the level of risk associated with investing in the company. Next, they were asked to allocate $10,000 between investing in the company versus a money market account. Five different questionnaires were created by varying information about an auditor switch and the reason for the switch. Results indicated that auditor switches produce higher investment risk assessments and marginally lower amounts invested than no auditor switches. Furthermore, the effects of resignations were not significantly different from the effects of dismissals. Also, disclosure of a disagreement as a reason for an auditor switch had no impact.

Keywords: Auditor switches; Auditor changes; Resignations; Dismissals; Investing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1052045715000053
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reacre:v:27:y:2015:i:1:p:39-44

DOI: 10.1016/j.racreg.2015.03.004

Access Statistics for this article

Research in Accounting Regulation is currently edited by G. Previts

More articles in Research in Accounting Regulation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().