Index investors and the return of stewardship accounting

Thomas A. King

Research in Accounting Regulation, 2018, vol. 30, issue 1, 26-30

Abstract: Passive asset managers, seeking to deliver investment returns that mirror market indices, now control and vote about 30% of all managed U.S. shares. When bad news surfaces, index investors do not sell a company's shares. Instead, these beneficial owners protect the value of equity investments by influencing governance practices to restore long-term value creation. Interviews with stewardship offices at leading index investment firms suggest that passive investors do not use financial accounting information to value securities. The implication of this study is that the current focus of accounting standard setting – predicated on the idea that the purpose of financial reporting is to permit prediction of future cash flows – does not meet the needs of a particular group of financial statement users who have considerable influence over the governance of leading listed companies around the world.

Keywords: Passive investing; Stewardship; Governance; Valuation; Financial reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reacre:v:30:y:2018:i:1:p:26-30

DOI: 10.1016/j.racreg.2018.03.004

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