Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly

Kenji Fujiwara ()

Resource and Energy Economics, 2011, vol. 33, issue 1, 1-11

Abstract: This article develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply contrasts to a static outcome. It is discussed that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies plays a decisive role in this finding.

Keywords: Differential; game; Asymmetric; oligopoly; Feedback; strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Losses from competition in a dynamic game model of a renewable resource oligopoly (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:33:y:2011:i:1:p:1-11

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