Firm-level political risk and CEO compensation

Chunmi Jeon, Seung Hun Han and Yunji Hwang

Research in International Business and Finance, 2025, vol. 73, issue PA

Abstract: This study examines the impact of firm-level political risk (FLPR) on CEO compensation. Firm cash flow and CEO bargaining power are examined to ascertain whether they moderate this relationship. FLPR exposure is measured using a computational linguistic method to analyze the manuscripts of firm earnings conference calls. The findings indicate that FLPR is negatively related to CEO compensation but that firm cash flow and CEO bargaining power positively moderate this relationship. These results are consistent with endogeneity and robustness tests, including alternative measures of FLPR and CEO compensation.

Keywords: Political risk; Firm-level; CEO compensation; Cash flow; CEO bargaining power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G32 J33 M12 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:73:y:2025:i:pa:s0275531924004070

DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102614

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