Welfare maximization in stable sharing services

Pietro Salmaso

Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 2024, vol. 93, issue C

Abstract: We propose a model of sharing of public services among local governments. Our model is an application of Nicoló et al. (2023) and combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1971) and the division problem (Sprumont, 1991). I show that the SAM algorithm provided in Nicoló et al. (2023) generates a stable allocation that maximizes utilitarian welfare when preferences are Euclidean single-peaked. We then discuss the incentive compatibility of the solution proposed and the relation with welfare functions different from the utilitarian one.

Keywords: Sharing services; Matching theory; Utilitarian welfare; Rawlsian welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceps:v:93:y:2024:i:c:s0038012124000430

DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2024.101844

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