The illusion of reform. The dilemma of structural telecommunications policy

Christopher Weare

Telecommunications Policy, 1996, vol. 20, issue 6, 415-427

Abstract: Structural telecommunication regulations that determine in what markets and under what conditions dominant firms may operate have developed in a chaotic and often contradictory manner in the United States. This article explores the causes and consequences of this policy instability using two disparate concepts: first, the policy development process is disjointed and incremental, and second, alternative regulatory regimes establish different contracting relations between telecommunication firms. The analysis demonstrates why, despite repeated efforts at reform, regulators have not succeeded in resolving the fundamental conflicts inherent in structural policy. In addition, criticisms that existing structural regulations impede innovation are found to be misplaced because no realistic, unproblematic alternative exists.

Date: 1996
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