Liberalizing US spectrum allocation

Thomas W. Hazlett

Telecommunications Policy, 2003, vol. 27, issue 7, 485-499

Abstract: In the US, adjudication of wireless entry under the "public interest" standard protects incumbent service providers. Excess demand exists for access to radio spectrum, despite a common misperception that license auctions held by regulators are tantamount to selling spectrum. Would-be suppliers are slowed by the regulatory process. After discussing the financial tolls extracted, the author suggests a number of structural policy reforms, applicable both to the USA and perhaps spectrum markets elsewhere. These include: permissive airwave use (within emission limits implicitly defined by the license); endowing licensees with use of adjacent buffer zones; exhaustive allocation of remaining bandwidth to new applicants and streamlining the process for entrants to gain access to unoccupied bandwidth, using liability rules and post-entry dispute resolution mechanisms.

Keywords: Spectrum; allocation; Liberalization; Wireless; Telecommunications; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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