On the competitive effects of mobile virtual network operators

Philip Kalmus and Lars Wiethaus

Telecommunications Policy, vol. 34, issue 5-6, 262-269

Abstract: Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) offer mobile telecoms services by purchasing capacity from mobile network operators (MNOs) and competing with the latter at the retail level. This paper employs a two stage model and analyses to what extent MVNOs may exert a competitive constraint on MNOs. In the first stage MNOs determine both their wholesale and retail capacities. In the second stage MNOs and MVNOs compete in the retail market. It is found that MNOs host MVNOs if and only if the latter do not exert a competitive constraint on MNOs' retail businesses. Thus, absent access regulation, MVNO entry may happen but is unlikely to reduce consumer prices. The results do not depend upon the scarcity of capacity.

Keywords: Competition; Mobile; telecommunication; MVNO; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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