Impact of decision sequence on reliability enhancement with supply disruption risks
Guo Li,
Lijun Zhang,
Xu Guan and
Junjun Zheng
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2016, vol. 90, issue C, 25-38
Abstract:
This paper considers a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a supplier who faces disruption risks. We investigate the impact of decision sequence on the supplier’s endogenous reliability enhancement and the firms’ equilibrium pricing strategies. The supply chain reliability achieves a higher level under the supplier–leader game, but this does not always lead to a higher payoff for the supply chain. Each firm prefers to make the decision first, while any decision sequence can become dominant for the supply chain. We also show that the supply chain can achieve coordination via the revenue sharing contract.
Keywords: Decision sequence; Reliability enhancement; Supply disruption risks; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554515001738
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:transe:v:90:y:2016:i:c:p:25-38
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600244/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... 600244/bibliographic
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2015.09.008
Access Statistics for this article
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is currently edited by W. Talley
More articles in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().