Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly

Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical rms with constant marginal cost compete a' la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and maximal total demand, we rst identify all combinations of equilibrium consumer surplus and industry prot that can arise from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, we x the average willingness to pay above marginal cost (i.e., rst-best surplus) and identify all possible triples of consumer surplus, industry prot and deadweight loss.

Keywords: Cournot; monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-08-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Theoretical Economics, 3, August, 2022. ISSN: 1933-6837

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/111890/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:111890

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().