Corporate capture of blockchain governance

Daniel Ferreira, Jin Li and Radoslawa Nikolowa

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. We show that the proof-of-work system may lead to a situation in which some large firms in the blockchain industrial ecosystem—blockchain conglomerates—capture the governance of the blockchain.

Keywords: governance; blockchain conglomerates; industrial ecosystem; proof-of-work (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 L13 M20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2023-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Review of Financial Studies, 1, April, 2023, 36(4), pp. 1364 - 1407. ISSN: 0893-9454

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:115618

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