Testing the ambition loop: do country- and company-level net-zero targets reinforce each other? A global comparison

Shaikh Eskander, Catherine Higham, Maggie Hamley, Joana Setzer and Sam Fankhauser ()

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: One theory about company- and country-level climate actions is that they interact with one another through a mutually reinforcing “ambition loop”. Using publicly available data on country- and company-level net-zero targets, our econometric analysis reveals a positive relationship between state and company: a country introducing a domestic net-zero target in law increases the likelihood of companies introducing their own voluntary targets and vice-versa. Our findings offer important insights into the mechanisms of climate governance – knowledge that will be critical if we are to meet global net-zero targets by 2050.

Keywords: ambition loop; climate targets; climate law; global comparison; net-zero targets; Ambition loop; Strategic Research Fund through Oxford Net Zero. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H32 K32 P00 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2024-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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Published in Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 1, May, 2024, 26(3-4), pp. 266 - 282. ISSN: 1387-6988

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:122252

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