Extending the formal state: the case of Pakistan's frontier crimes regulation

Mike Callen, Saad Gulzar, Arman Rezaee and Jacob N. Shapiro

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Why do modern states allow parts of their territory to be governed by non-state actors? We study this question using the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in Pakistan, a British Colonial law abrogated only in 2018, which left governance to pre-colonial tribal councils in large parts of modern day Pakistan. In areas where the FCR did not apply, the British and then Pakistani state built modern political and bureaucratic institutions. Using primary legal documents, we build a dataset of when and where the FCR applied between 1901 and 2012. The territorial extent of the formal state is both cleanly demarcated by this law and varies substantially over time, permitting an empirical examination of the determinants of state control. The data reveal that the Green Revolution's potential to transform agriculture played a major role in extending the formal state. The law was repealed first from areas where agricultural productivity benefited the most from the Green Revolution. This is consistent with a model in which technological changes that shift the returns to control influence where states choose to govern.

Keywords: legal institutions; innovation; agriculture; green revolution; Pakistan; Frontier Crimes Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Published in Economica, 1, July, 2024, 91(363), pp. 701-718. ISSN: 0013-0427

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