Signaling and discrimination in collaborative projects

Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public’s credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant “identities.” We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. (JEL A11, D82, I23).

JEL-codes: A11 D82 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2023-01-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ppm
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Published in American Economic Review, 31, January, 2023, 113(1), pp. 210-252. ISSN: 0002-8282

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Related works:
Journal Article: Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects (2023)
Working Paper: Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects (2021)
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