The short- and long-run effect of affirmative action: evidence from Imperial China
Melanie Xue and
Boxiao Zhang
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
We study the short- and long-term effects of affirmative action policies in the context of China. During imperial China, official positions were awarded to the most academically talented individuals through a multi-stage examination process administered by the central government. In 1712, a reform was implemented to address disparities in exam performance, aiming to equalize acceptance rates across provinces and increase representation from underrepresented regions. Using a unique dataset, we analyze career outcomes and find that more candidates from underrepresented provinces secured positions without compromising their performance after the reform. However, sub-provincial units showed different trends. Although the reform ended in 1905, the gap between underrepresented provinces and others widened again, but some effects of the reform remained. Moreover, the intervention had spillover effects, extending its impact to secondary education.
Keywords: affirmative action; education; inequality; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H75 I28 J71 N40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2025-04-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-lma
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:128023
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