Macroeconomic implications of executive pay caps
Francesco Caselli
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
I study the introduction of statutory caps on executive pay ratios (pay caps) in a span-of control economy with heterogeneous managerial talent. Managers hire fewer workers than they would in the absence of pay caps, and the marginal product of labor is not equalized among firms. The ability of the marginal manager declines. Inequality between managers and workers, and among managers, declines, but inequality among workers increases. Quan titatively, overall inequality decreases substantially, especially via a reduction in top income shares, but the GDP losses are also significant. In addition, the redistribution favours the “middle” deciles between 50 and 90, rather than the bottom 50% of the income distribution. Future work will build on this “first pass” to analyze the effect of pay caps in economies distorted by monopsony power, non-pecuniary benefits of control, and managerial rent ex traction.
Keywords: ARRAY(0x5d7fc326e560) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 E25 J33 M52 P13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Published in Journal of the European Economic Association, 5, October, 2026. ISSN: 1542-4774
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:140903
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