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Poaching, raids, and managerial compensation

Yi Chen, Fabiano Dal-Ri, Thomas Jungbauer and Daniela Scur

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper presents a model of employee poaching with asymmetric employer learning. Firms poach managers not only due to their track record but also for their personnel-specific information about workers. In equilibrium, more productive firms poach managers, whose compensation increases in the quality of their information about workers. While poaching reassigns more able workers to more productive firms, efficiency does not obtain due to information frictions. Drawing on the universe of contracts in Brazil's formal labor market, we test implications of our model and show they are consistent with manager and worker movements and their compensation histories.

Keywords: ARRAY(0x5e21a2e29200) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D21 J24 J30 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2025-08-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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