Polarization, crises, and accountability: The role of conditional partisan bias in economic perceptions

Iván Sánchez-Marañón

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Does partisanship undermine economic accountability? Although research shows that partisan bias in economic perceptions varies across economic conditions, the explanation for this variation remains contested. An ambiguity account expects the partisan gap to narrow whenever economic signals are clear, in booms as in busts; a threat account expects it to narrow only when conditions deteriorate severely. Because both accounts predict compression during downturns, separating them means observing strong, sustained growth as well, ideally among the same citizens who lived through the crisis. Using twelve waves of Spanish panel data covering a full economic cycle (2010–2020), I find the asymmetric pattern the threat account predicts: the gap between government and opposition partisans compresses sharply during crises but persists, and widens, during strong expansion. Strong identifiers display roughly twice the gap of weak identifiers at every point in the cycle, yet both groups compress at similar rates as conditions deteriorate. Finally, economic evaluations continue to shape government approval and incumbent support in a pattern consistent with the theorized accountability chain. Even in one of its more politically and economically turbulent decades, Spain shows that accountability is still solid when it is most needed.

Keywords: crisis; democratic accountability; economic voting; partisan bias; polarization; Spain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-16
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Published in Electoral Studies, 16, October, 2026, 104. ISSN: 0261-3794

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