Collective bargaining under complete information

Carlos Diaz-Moreno and Jose Galdon-Sanchez ()

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In this paper, we build and structurally estimate a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation for Spain. For large firms, the assumption of complete information seems a sensible one, and it matches the collective bargaining environment better than the one provided by private information models. The specification of the model with players having different discount factors allows us to measure their relative bargaining power, a recurrent question in the theory of bargaining. We find that both entrepreneurs and workers have high discount factors, and no evidence that entrepreneurs have bigger bargaining power as usually assumed.

Keywords: Delays; sequential bargaining; structural estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2000-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19337/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Collective Bargaining under Complete Information (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:19337

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