Incentive design under loss aversion

David de Meza and David C. Webb

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Compensation schemes often reward success but do not penalize failure. Fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature. Yet the standard principal–agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance. This paper shows that, under loss aversion, there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance, with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal, especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is endogenous. A further benefit of capping losses, for example through options, is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes.

JEL-codes: F3 F4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2006-05-16
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24523/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive Design under Loss Aversion (2007)
Working Paper: Incentive Design under Loss Aversion (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:24523

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