Quakers, coercion and pre-modern growth: why friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement did not matter for early Atlantic trade expansion

Esther Sahle

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: During the late seventeenth century the Atlantic trade experienced unprecedented growth. The New Institutional Economists attribute this to the emergence of new institutions for property rights enforcement. During this period, Quakers emerged as the region’s most prominent trading community. This paper constitutes the first study of the London Quaker community. In contrast to the literature, claiming that they enjoyed a competitive advantage due to their church’s formal institutions for contract enforcement, this paper argues that Friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement emerged only after 1750. This constituted a response to contemporary concern about debt.

Keywords: institutions; Quakers; early modern trade; merchants; religion; Atlantic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N33 N73 N93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2014-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:60452

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