Merging to License: Internal vs. External Patentee

Joel Sandonis and Ramón Faulí Oller

No 1134-8984, DFAEII Working Papers from University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II

Abstract: In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal to the industry patentee. We show that a merger is profitable only for the case of small innovations whereas only large innovations make it welfare improving. As a consequence, the antitrust authority should forbid all (profitable) mergers.

Keywords: patent licensing; two-part tariff contracts; external vs. internal patentee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Merging to License: Internal vs. External Patentee (2003)
Working Paper: MERGING TO LICENSE: INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL PATENTEE (2003)
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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, = Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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