A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules

Francisco Javier Arin Aguirre, María Elena Iñarra García and Paloma Luquin

No 6372, IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: This paper provides a noncooperative understanding of the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation for airport cost problems. We find that every Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game has the nucleolus as outcome while the egalitarian allocation is just one of the Nash outcomes.

Keywords: airport games; egalitarian allocation; nucleolus; Nash outcomes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6372

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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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