Monotonic core solutions: Beyond Young's theorem

Francisco Javier Arin Aguirre

No 6373, IKERLANAK from Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I

Abstract: We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: single-valued solution concepts that always select a core allocation whenever the game is balanced (has a nonempty core). We present one result of impossibility for one of the properties and we pose several open questions for the second property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy the property even in the class of convex games.

Keywords: monotonicity; core; TU games; nucleolus per capita (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
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Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

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