Provider Incentives and Delivery of Developmental Goods

Ajit Mishra and Sudipta Sarangi

No 14/10, Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Bath, Department of Economics

Abstract: We use a donor-provider-agent framework to study the delivery of developmental goods (i.e. aid, credit, technology transfer to poor). The need to provide incentives for the intermediate provider has been a key issue in the recent academic as well as non-academic discourses. We show that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communications between the provider and the agents. We study the interplay between incentives and communication failure in the presence of motivated providers who derive benefits from helping the disadvantaged.

Keywords: developmental goods; communication; incentives; motivated provider (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eid:wpaper:22126

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