Mixed duopoly with wage-rise contract as strategic commitment

Kazuhiro Ohnishi
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Kazuhiro Ohnishi: Osaka University and Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan

Ekonomia, 2008, vol. 11, issue 1, 35-49

Abstract: This paper examines a quantity-setting mixed market model in which both a social-welfare-maximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm can adopt wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the public firm is the leader.

JEL-codes: H42 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ekn:ekonom:v:11:y:2008:i:1:p:35-49

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