On the Optimal Sanction Structure When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension

Tim Friehe and Tim Friehe
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tim Friehe

Chapter 4 in The Shadow Economy, Corruption and Governance, 2008, pp 63-76 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This book contributes to the current debates on the shadow economy and related issues of tax evasion and corruption. The approach taken here is one that will develop a better understanding of these related issues, which are increasingly seen as impediments to country competitiveness and economic growth.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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