 Conclusion: the centrality of market structure and the limits of national authority. Chapter 9 in Competition Policy and the Control of Buyer Power, 2017, pp 269-280 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: This chapter summarizes the central points of this book. It reiterates the conclusion that buyer power is a significant threat to the competitive process. But consistent with Chapters 5 and 6 control of such power once it exists is difficult. For that reason, competition policy should focus on policies that can avoid or limit the creation of such power. Specifically, this means that a robust merger standard and clear limits on the scope of buying groups are key components for competition policy. The chapter also argues that the scope of the buyer power problem is more pervasive than most common illustrations, including those relied on in this book, might suggest. Lastly, the chapter points out that the global nature of many of the buyer power issues identified means that existing national law enforcement may be unable to provide effective control even if it has the appropriate policies. While this issue is beyond the scope of this specific project, it is an important one for competition policy generally and especially for policy to control abusive buyer power. Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:15260_9 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
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