No representation without taxation. For a history of budgetary control in the European Union

Alessandro Isoni

Chapter 4 in Features and Challenges of the EU Budget, 2019, pp 44-59 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter aims to bring to light how well the complex set of procedures concerning the EU budget represents the existence of a democratic deficit in the European Union. Starting from the development of the English constitutional experience, this chapter analyses how the procedures in force at European Union level for the budget approval are very far from the Western constitutional patterns, where a clear checks and balances system is usually established in order to ensure the control of people on the executive power. In this line, the same reforms adopted in the last decades appear in another light, since they seem to have only contributed to complicating the democratic control over EU budget, eventually leading to a stronger power of Member States.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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