Some game-theoretic aspects of Brexit

Roland Kirstein

Chapter 2 in Brexit, 2021, pp 34-78 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The paper applies cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to various aspects of Brexit. The 2016 referendum is analysed as a “simple voting game,†challenging the view that the majority supports a “no-deal†Brexit. The next analysis applies the economic theory of voter participation to the referendum. The third model section takes a closer look at the negotiations between the UK and the EU, focusing on the transition from Theresa May to Boris Johnson. Nash bargaining theory suggests that employing a delegate whose preferences deviate from that of the people she represents may provide a strategic advantage. Switching from May to Johnson may therefore have improved the UK’s bargaining position. Finally, the paper discusses existing literature on the game-theoretic analysis of Brexit.

Keywords: Economics and Finance; Law - Academic; Politics and Public Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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