System rivalry during pandemic times: an institutional political economy view of great power vaccine diplomacy
Naoise McDonagh
Chapter 7 in A Research Agenda for COVID-19 and Society, 2022, pp 105-120 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
Growing tensions between the United States and China over differences between their economic models have been amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic, as both countries have sought to use vaccine diplomacy to shore up their international soft power. This has resulted in competition to produce and distribute vaccines separately rather than cooperatively, threatening to result in a less efficient global vaccination outcome. Why has vaccine diplomacy become a proxy for great power rivalry? This chapter addresses tensions arising from China's state capitalism, which has grown to be second largest economy in the world, a global manufacturing power, and a direct technological competitor with the U.S. It is suggested that China's historical status as a returning power is an important context for understanding China's motives and behaviour in challenging the U.S. broadly, as well as during provision of global public goods - in this case COVID-19 vaccines. Conceptual insights will be drawn from comparative capitalism grounded in institutional political economy, which theorizes the role of institutions, culture and history in determining the emergence of variations of capitalism. This framework reveals the deep socio-economic roots of today's clash of economic systems. This chapter aims to provide insight into historical and institutional factors driving this clash with the goal of supporting a research agenda for global cooperation on the provision of vaccines as a global public good.
Keywords: Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Sociology and Social Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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