“Killer Acquisitions” or “Killing Innovation”: Antitrust Implications of the New Wave of Tech Acquisitions and the New European and Italian Regimes for Below-Threshold Mergers

Valeria Falce and Nicola M. F. Faraone

Chapter 17 in Research Handbook on Competition and Corporate Law, 2025, pp 331-366 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The changes introduced in the EU on the subject of concentrations (Article 22 EU Merger Regulation (EUMR)), together with the 2021 Annual Law for Market and Competition (approved by Law No. 118/2022), suggest a renewed reflection on the so-called killer acquisitions. In particular, the present work intends to contribute to the debate by analysing the reasons, identifying limits and then proposing corrective measures from a de jure condito perspective. The starting point of the analysis is the regulatory context as provided by Law No. 118/2022. However, the attribution of new powers to competition authorities, while reflecting a wider European trend towards flexibility and discretion, reveals severe limitations, some of which have already emerged after the Illumina/Grail case and others not excluded by Article 14 DMA. The chapter will conclude with corrective proposals, which may safeguard the degree of innovation within the market and preserve digital players’ legitimate expansion strategies.

Keywords: Killer Acquisitions; EU Merger Control; Article 22 Referrals; EUMR; DMA; 2021 Annual Law for Market and Competition; Law No. 118/2022; Towercast (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781803920542
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