Multiple equilibria? Don’t panic! – a hitchhiker's guide to global games
Kartik Anand and
Philipp J. König
Chapter 12 in Research Handbook of Macroprudential Policy, 2026, pp 261-295 from Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract:
This article provides a practical overview for applying the global games approach to solve models with multiple equilibria that are often used in discussions on financial and macroprudential policies. Global games offer a tractable approach to resolve multiple equilibria by introducing incomplete information, thereby yielding unique equilibrium predictions. The article proceeds along the lines of a simple regime change game with strategic complementarities. Starting from the canonical regime change game with homogeneous players, it extends the discussion to include heterogeneous groups of players and interlinkages across different institutions with different sets of players. These extensions highlight not only how strategic complementarities can amplify fragility across players and institutions but also how heterogeneity and interlinkages affect the design of micro- and macroprudential policy interventions. Finally, the article briefly discusses the application of global games to dynamic coordination games.
Keywords: Bank runs; Global games; Coordination failures; Information frictions; Financial stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035306206
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:22037_13
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