What do information choices tell us about selfishness? Preference construction and preference revelation

Danae Arroyos-Calvera, Rebecca McDonald, Daniel Read and Bruce Rigal

Chapter 9 in Research Handbook on Unethical Behavior, 2026, pp 138-157 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: People who choose to remain ignorant about the consequences of their actions on others act more selfishly. We distinguish between two explanations for this: preference construction, according to which information received or shared determines our preferences, and preference revelation, according to which our selfishness determines the information we want to receive or share. We distinguished between these explanations by means of a modified dictator game with three treatments differing in who knows the endowment (the “information state”) and whether this knowledge is determined through a choice made by the dictator or through random assignment. Regardless of what information state dictators were assigned to, those who chose to hide information from themselves and/or recipients were more selfish than those who chose for everyone to be informed. This supports the preference revelation hypothesis. We conclude with a simple model that interprets the decisions between selfishness and disclosure decisions.

Keywords: Information avoidance; Generosity; Self-image; Moral wiggle room; Sorting; Dictator game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035307265
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