The ‘collateral effects’ of criminalization choices

Martina Galli

Chapter 7 in Research Handbook on Penal Policy, 2026, pp 132-152 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Chapter 7 examines the often-overlooked collateral effects of criminalization choices. Drawing on philosophical and sociological perspectives, it argues that criminalization frequently produces adverse outcomes that diverge from its intended objectives—not only prison overcrowding and increased public expenditure, but also criminogenic effects and the deterrence of socially beneficial behavior. Although these effects are theoretically foreseeable, they are routinely overlooked in the design of penal policy. The chapter begins by developing a conceptual framework that distinguishes between dysfunctional collateral effects and broader unintended consequences marked by high social costs. It then analyzes the tools available to lawmakers to anticipate and mitigate these negative externalities, with particular focus on criminal justice impact assessments. Finally, it explores how courts engage with collateral consequences in their reasoning and considers the benefits and challenges of formally integrating the assessment of collateral effects into the penal policymaking process.

Keywords: Collateral effects; Criminalization; Impact assessment; Penal policymaking; Consequentialism; Effect-oriented judicial decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035308521
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