 A tale of obsession: is autonomous algorithmic collusion the white whale of competition law?Jerome De Cooman Chapter Chapter 26 in Research Handbook on the Law of Artificial Intelligence, 2025, pp 596-613 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: For the past ten years, lawyers and economists interested in competition law have been concerned about the emergence of autonomous algorithmic collusion, that is, collusion that does not involve human communications. Given that a meeting of minds is required for a competition law infringement to exist, the consensus is that such autonomous algorithmic collusion would escape competition law enforcement. They have therefore proposed many interesting solutions to mitigate the risk of regulatory loopholes. Yet, despite ten years of studies and research, algorithmic collusion remains unnoticed in an actual market setting. This is not to say that there is no evidence pointing towards the risk of autonomous algorithmic collusion. However, empirical, experimental and theoretical evidence of autonomous algorithmic collusion are limited and cannot support the prospect of such collusion with an absolute certainty. Against that background, this chapter argues that a crucial requirement is the development of an enhanced theoretical, experimental and empirical comprehension regarding the likelihood of autonomous algorithmic collusion occurring in an actual market-setting. This must precede considerations about the resilience of the existing competition law regime. Concluding that competition law is inadequately equipped to safeguard consumers from autonomous algorithmic collusion is premature when there remains uncertainty about the practical scope of concerns and the specific types of pricing algorithms in use. Acquiring such insights while ensuring a suitable level of competition protection involves the establishments of regulatory sandboxes. Allowing undertakings to test their pricing algorithms within a secure and controlled regulatory environment enables them to observe the potential convergence towards supra-competitive pricing. Concurrently, through ongoing supervision and individualised guidance, competition authorities can enhance their understanding of how pricing algorithms operate in actual market-settings. Keywords: Algorithmic collusion; Competition law; Pricing algorithm; Regulatory sandbox; Artificial intelligence (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:22539_26 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
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