Ceasefires and security arrangements

Govinda Clayton and Irena Grizelj

Chapter 3 in Handbook on the Politics of International Agreements, 2026, pp 49-61 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter examines ceasefires as a diverse family of arrangements that suspend or end violence within armed conflict. It clarifies conceptual confusion by distinguishing among truces, cessations of hostilities, and preliminary and definitive ceasefires, outlining their different purposes, from humanitarian relief and conflict management to conflict resolution. Drawing on recent quantitative and qualitative research, it analyzes when and why ceasefires occur, what shapes their durability, and how they interact with political negotiations. The chapter highlights how political will, strategic incentives, and design features, particularly monitoring and verification, determine ceasefire outcomes. It also explores risks of manipulation, fragmentation, and entrenchment of the status quo. By integrating theoretical and empirical insights, the chapter provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how ceasefires can both halt violence and influence the trajectory of peace processes.

Keywords: Ceasefires; Conflict Management; Peace Processes; Security Arrangements; Mediation; Conflict Resolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035318582
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