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Agency problems during mergers and acquisitions

Eliezer M. Fich and Thomas P. Griffin

Chapter 4 in The Elgar Companion to the Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 2026, pp 113-145 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) represent a critical arena where agency conflicts between managers and shareholders often have very important economic consequences. This chapter explores two dimensions of these conflicts. First, we examine the market for corporate control as an external governance mechanism, analyzing how takeover threats discipline underperforming management and how antitakeover provisions lessen this disciplinary function. Second, we discuss agency-driven motives (e.g., empire building, free cash flow, overvalued equity) as well as certain managerial characteristics (e.g., risk aversion, overconfidence) that often lead to value-destroying acquisitions. We review governance mechanisms that constrain these conflicts: board monitoring, equity-based compensation, institutional shareholder oversight, shareholder voting rights, hedge fund activism, short-selling pressure, creditor control, and media scrutiny. Drawing on 50 years of research since Jensen and Meckling's foundational work, we synthesize key findings and identify future research opportunities in areas including passive institutional ownership, regulatory evolution, artificial intelligence applications, digital currencies, and M&A waves.

Keywords: Agency Theory; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Antitakeover Provisions; Empire Building; Free Cash Flow Hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035324057
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