Addressing intergovernmental distributional impacts of climate fiscal risks

Giorgio Brosio, Juan Pablo Jiménez and Ignacio Ruelas Avila

Chapter 3 in Elgar Companion on Inequality and Natural Resources, 2026, pp 28-52 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Decarbonization policies worldwide will reduce the demand for fossil fuels while increasing the demand for critical minerals. This transition represents a new fiscal risk, involving the possibility of significant short- to medium-term differences between actual and expected fiscal performance at all levels of government. The effect will be especially acute where subnational governments have access to natural resource revenues. Addressing these risks requires adjustments to sharing schemes, including equalization mechanisms. Thus, critical questions arise, such as whether to continue or discontinue sharing schemes with subnational governments, whether on a symmetrical or asymmetrical basis, and on which criteria of justice. The chapter will explore these and related issues, aiming to adapt distributive justice theories, developed initially to assign global property rights on natural resources, to the intergovernmental level. The analysis will frequently reference the present situation and future outlook in Latin America, notably Bolivia.

Keywords: Decarbonization; Non-renewable Natural Resource Revenues; Fiscal Equalization Transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035327362
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781035327379.00008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:23071_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.e-elgar.com

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jack Sweeney ().