Taxation under resource nationalism

Raúl Aldaz Peña and Andrés Mejía Acosta

Chapter 11 in Handbook of Resource Nationalism, 2026, pp 167-183 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Taxing extractive industries is an attractive instrument for mobilizing revenues, especially when governments want to avoid bargaining new taxes with voters. What's unclear is whether states in resource-rich countries have greater control over the extraction and allocation of their natural resource wealth, distributional conflicts, or developmental outcomes. This chapter examines those gaps through discussion of various tax regimes in Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru in the context of resource nationalism. It analyzes the extent to which states have developed the institutional capacity to extract natural resource revenues, regulate markets, and promote developmental outcomes. It argues that asserting control over the extraction and management of natural resources is a necessary but insufficient condition to maximize revenue collection. Rather than finding a linear association between these attributes, the chapter finds significant disparities that are shaped by preexisting political coalitions and institutional legacies in each country.

Keywords: Tax Policy; Taxation; Extractive Industries; Resource Nationalism; State Capacity; Andes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035333431
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