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Non-criminal penalties for sanctions violation

Francesca Finelli

Chapter 61 in Elgar Encyclopedia of International Sanctions, 2025, pp 215-217 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: The effective enforcement of sanctions is essential for ensuring their credibility and achieving their foreign policy objectives. National authorities play a primary role in detecting violations, imposing penalties, and fostering compliance. While criminal penalties often receive greater attention, non-criminal enforcement mechanisms play an equally vital role. These measures allow for swift and cost-effective responses, in comparison to criminal penalties, which require higher evidentiary standards and lengthy procedures. Some sanctioning states, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have established specialized agencies to enforce sanctions through monetary fines and administrative penalties. In contrast, the EU currently lacks a centralized agency, relying on a fragmented system where national authorities retain discretion over non-criminal penalties. Although the EU has recently moved towards criminalization, this shift overlooks the complementary role of non-criminal measures. Recent enforcement trends highlight the need for a balanced approach that integrates both criminal and non-criminal penalties to enhance compliance and deterrence.

Keywords: Enforcement; Non-criminal penalties; Effectiveness; National competent authorities; Agencies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035339525
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