Judgement as the basis for institutional logics: theorizing practical reason in institutional fields

Alexander Styhre ()

Chapter 4 in A Pragmatist Theory of Economic Reason, 2025, pp 89-103 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Institutional theory has been established as an authoritative view of organizational activities, but the theory is still burdened by its incapacity to bridge the structural level of analysis and agency on the level of practices. In a considerable number of empirical studies, practices are claimed to be grounded in, or derived from beliefs, preferences and cognitive capacities that are provided within the institutional setting wherein the observed practice is located. Such a theory is premised on self-referentiality and recursivity, and the chapter addresses this analytical concern on the basis of an analytical philosophy corpus, and argues that institutionally embedded principles do matter in promoting rational and morally desirable behaviour, but only ex post, when such beliefs, propositional attitudes, and so on are already established as legitimate resources for rational actors to refer to justify their actions and behaviours.

Keywords: Institutional theory; Institutional logic; Theory of practice; Judgement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035343911
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